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Criminal
Pre-trial Intervention
A person who successfully completes the Pre-trial Intervention or Pre-Trial Diversion program can if otherwise eligible have the case sealed and or expunged. Pre-Trial Intervention is for felony charges and Pre-Trial Diversion is for Misdemeanor charges.
948.08 Pretrial intervention program.—
(1)The department shall supervise pretrial intervention programs for persons charged with a crime, before or after any information has been filed or an indictment has been returned in the circuit court. Such programs shall provide appropriate counseling, education, supervision, and medical and psychological treatment as available and when appropriate for the persons released to such programs. (2)Any first offender, or any person previously convicted of not more than one nonviolent misdemeanor, who is charged with any misdemeanor or felony of the third degree is eligible for release to the pretrial intervention program on the approval of the administrator of the program and the consent of the victim, the state attorney, and the judge who presided at the initial appearance hearing of the offender. However, the defendant may not be released to the pretrial intervention program unless, after consultation with his or her attorney, he or she has voluntarily agreed to such program and has knowingly and intelligently waived his or her right to a speedy trial for the period of his or her diversion. The defendant or the defendant’s immediate family may not personally contact the victim or the victim’s immediate family to acquire the victim’s consent under this section.
(3)The criminal charges against an offender admitted to the program shall be continued without final disposition for a period of 90 days after the date the offender was released to the program, if the offender’s participation in the program is satisfactory, and for an additional 90 days upon the request of the program administrator and consent of the state attorney, if the offender’s participation in the program is satisfactory. (4)Resumption of pending criminal proceedings shall be undertaken at any time if the program administrator or state attorney finds that the offender is not fulfilling his or her obligations under this plan or if the public interest so requires. The court may not appoint the public defender to represent an indigent offender released to the pretrial intervention program unless the offender’s release is revoked and the offender is subject to imprisonment if convicted.
(5)At the end of the intervention period, the administrator shall recommend:
(a)That the case revert to normal channels for prosecution in instances in which the offender’s participation in the program has been unsatisfactory;
(b)That the offender is in need of further supervision; or
(c)That dismissal of charges without prejudice shall be entered in instances in which prosecution is not deemed necessary.
The state attorney shall make the final determination as to whether the prosecution shall continue.
(6)(a)For purposes of this subsection, the term “nonviolent felony” means a third degree felony violation of chapter 810 or any other felony offense that is not a forcible felony as defined in s. 776.08.
White Collar Crime
White Collar Crime really just means a non-violent crime–usually some kind of fraud (organized or not), or theft done with paper, credit card, etc…
Child Abuse
827.04. Contributing to the delinquency or dependency of a child; penalty
(1) Any person who:
(a) Commits any act which causes, tends to cause, encourages, or contributes to a child becoming a delinquent or dependent child or a child in need of services; or
(b) Induces or endeavors to induce, by act, threat, command, or persuasion, a child to commit or perform any act, follow any course of conduct, or live in a manner that causes or tends to cause such child to become or to remain a dependent or delinquent child or a child in need of services,commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(2) It is not necessary for any court exercising juvenile jurisdiction to make an adjudication that any child is delinquent or dependent or a child in need of services in order to prosecute a violation of this section. An adjudication that a child is delinquent or dependent or a child in need of services shall not preclude a subsequent prosecution of a violation of this section.
(3) A person 21 years of age or older who impregnates a child under 16 years of age commits an act of child abuse which constitutes a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. A person who impregnates a child in violation of this subsection commits an offense under this subsection regardless of whether the person is found to have committed, or has been charged with or prosecuted for, any other offense committed during the course of the same criminal transaction or episode, including, but not limited to, an offense proscribed under s. 800.04, relating to lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon any person under 16 years of age. Neither the victim’s lack of chastity nor the victim’s consent is a defense to the crime proscribed under this subsection.
827.03. Abuse, aggravated abuse, and neglect of a child; penalties
(1) “Child abuse” means:
(a) Intentional infliction of physical or mental injury upon a child;
(b) An intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child; or
(c) Active encouragement of any person to commit an act that results or could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child.
A person who knowingly or willfully abuses a child without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) “Aggravated child abuse” occurs when a person:
(a) Commits aggravated battery on a child;
(b) Willfully tortures, maliciously punishes, or willfully and unlawfully cages a child; or
(c) Knowingly or willfully abuses a child and in so doing causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child.
A person who commits aggravated child abuse commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3)(a) “Neglect of a child” means:
1. A caregiver’s failure or omission to provide a child with the care, supervision, and services necessary to maintain the child’s physical and mental health, including, but not limited to, food, nutrition, clothing, shelter, supervision, medicine, and medical services that a prudent person would consider essential for the well-being of the child; or
2. A caregiver’s failure to make a reasonable effort to protect a child from abuse, neglect, or exploitation by another person.
Neglect of a child may be based on repeated conduct or on a single incident or omission that results in, or could reasonably be expected to result in, serious physical or mental injury, or a substantial risk of death, to a child.
(b) A person who willfully or by culpable negligence neglects a child and in so doing causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(c) A person who willfully or by culpable negligence neglects a child without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
Credit Card Fraud & Identity Theft
817.61. Fraudulent use of credit cards
A person who, with intent to defraud the issuer or a person or organization providing money, goods, services, or anything else of value or any other person, uses, for the purpose of obtaining money, goods, services, or anything else of value, a credit card obtained or retained in violation of this part or a credit card which he or she knows is forged, or who obtains money, goods, services, or anything else of value by representing, without the consent of the cardholder, that he or she is the holder of a specified card or by representing that he or she is the holder of a card and such card has not in fact been issued violates this section. A person who, in any 6-month period, uses a credit card in violation of this section two or fewer times, or obtains money, goods, services, or anything else in violation of this section the value of which is less than $100, is subject to the penalties set forth in s. 817.67(1). A person who, in any 6-month period, uses a credit card in violation of this section more than two times, or obtains money, goods, services, or anything else in violation of this section the value of which is $100 or more, is subject to the penalties set forth in s. 817.67(2).
817.67. Penalties
(1) A person who is subject to the penalties of this subsection shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(2) A person who is subject to the penalties of this subsection is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
<General Materials (GM) – References, Annotations, or Tables>
817.568. Criminal use of personal identification information
(1) As used in this section, the term:
(a) “Access device” means any card, plate, code, account number, electronic serial number, mobile identification number, personal identification number, or other telecommunications service, equipment, or instrument identifier, or other means of account access that can be used, alone or in conjunction with another access device, to obtain money, goods, services, or any other thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of funds, other than a transfer originated solely by paper instrument.
(b) “Authorization” means empowerment, permission, or competence to act.
© “Harass” means to engage in conduct directed at a specific person that is intended to cause substantial emotional distress to such person and serves no legitimate purpose. “Harass” does not mean to use personal identification information for accepted commercial purposes. The term does not include constitutionally protected conduct such as organized protests or the use of personal identification information for accepted commercial purposes.
(d) “Individual” means a single human being and does not mean a firm, association of individuals, corporation, partnership, joint venture, sole proprietorship, or any other entity.
(e) “Person” means a “person” as defined in s. 1.01(3).
(f) “Personal identification information” means any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual, including any:
1. Name, social security number, date of birth, official state-issued or United States-issued driver’s license or identification number, alien registration number, government passport number, employer or taxpayer identification number, Medicaid or food stamp account number, or bank account or credit card number;
2. Unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris image, or other unique physical representation;
3. Unique electronic identification number, address, or routing code; or
4. Telecommunication identifying information or access device.
(2)(a) Any person who willfully and without authorization fraudulently uses, or possesses with intent to fraudulently use, personal identification information concerning an individual without first obtaining that individual’s consent, commits the offense of fraudulent use of personal identification information, which is a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(b) Any person who willfully and without authorization fraudulently uses personal identification information concerning an individual without first obtaining that individual’s consent commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if the pecuniary benefit, the value of the services received, the payment sought to be avoided, or the amount of the injury or fraud perpetrated is $5,000 or more or if the person fraudulently uses the personal identification information of 10 or more individuals without their consent. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall sentence any person convicted of committing the offense described in this paragraph to a mandatory minimum sentence of 3 years’ imprisonment.
© Any person who willfully and without authorization fraudulently uses personal identification information concerning an individual without first obtaining that individual’s consent commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if the pecuniary benefit, the value of the services received, the payment sought to be avoided, or the amount of the injury or fraud perpetrated is $50,000 or more or if the person fraudulently uses the personal identification information of 20 or more individuals without their consent. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall sentence any person convicted of committing the offense described in this paragraph:
1. To a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment.
2. To a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment, if the pecuniary benefit, the value of the services received, the payment sought to be avoided, or the amount of the injury or fraud perpetrated is $100,000 or more or if the person fraudulently uses the personal identification information of 30 or more individuals without their consent.
(3) Neither paragraph (2)(b) nor paragraph (2)(c) prevents a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law. If the minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment imposed under paragraph (2)(b) or paragraph (2)(c) exceed the maximum sentences authorized under s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921, the mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed. If the mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment under paragraph (2)(b) or paragraph (2)(c) are less than the sentence that could be imposed under s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921, the sentence imposed by the court must include the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment as required by paragraph (2)(b) or paragraph (2)(c).
(4) Any person who willfully and without authorization possesses, uses, or attempts to use personal identification information concerning an individual without first obtaining that individual’s consent, and who does so for the purpose of harassing that individual, commits the offense of harassment by use of personal identification information, which is a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(5) If an offense prohibited under this section was facilitated or furthered by the use of a public record, as defined in s. 119.011, the offense is reclassified to the next higher degree as follows:
(a) A misdemeanor of the first degree is reclassified as a felony of the third degree.
(b) A felony of the third degree is reclassified as a felony of the second degree
(c) A felony of the second degree is reclassified as a felony of the first degree.
For purposes of sentencing under chapter 921 and incentive gain-time eligibility under chapter 944, a felony offense that is reclassified under this subsection is ranked one level above the ranking under s. 921.0022 of the felony offense committed, and a misdemeanor offense that is reclassified under this subsection is ranked in level 2 of the offense severity ranking chart in s. 921.0022.
(6) Any person who willfully and without authorization fraudulently uses personal identification information concerning an individual who is less than 18 years of age without first obtaining the consent of that individual or of his or her legal guardian commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(7) Any person who is in the relationship of parent or legal guardian, or who otherwise exercises custodial authority over an individual who is less than 18 years of age, who willfully and fraudulently uses personal identification information of that individual commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(8) This section does not prohibit any lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or intelligence activity of a law enforcement agency of this state or any of its political subdivisions, of any other state or its political subdivisions, or of the Federal Government or its political subdivisions.
(9)(a) In sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense under this section, the court may order that the defendant make restitution pursuant to s. 775.089 to any victim of the offense. In addition to the victim’s out-of-pocket costs, such restitution may include payment of any other costs, including attorney’s fees incurred by the victim in clearing the victim’s credit history or credit rating, or any costs incurred in connection with any civil or administrative proceeding to satisfy any debt, lien, or other obligation of the victim arising as the result of the actions of the defendant.
(b) The sentencing court may issue such orders as are necessary to correct any public record that contains false information given in violation of this section.
(10) Prosecutions for violations of this section may be brought on behalf of the state by any state attorney or by the statewide prosecutor.
(11) The Legislature finds that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the location where a victim gives or fails to give consent to the use of personal identification information is the county where the victim generally resides.
(12) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, venue for the prosecution and trial of violations of this section may be commenced and maintained in any county in which an element of the offense occurred, including the county where the victim generally resides.
(13) A prosecution of an offense prohibited under subsection (2), subsection (6), or subsection (7) must be commenced within 3 years after the offense occurred. However, a prosecution may be commenced within 1 year after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party, or by a person who has a legal duty to represent the aggrieved party and who is not a party to the offense, if such prosecution is commenced within 5 years after the violation occurred.
Bad (Worthless) Checks
A bad check of $150.00 or more is a felony. Stopping payment on a check is only a crime if it was stopped with the intent to defraud someone. It is a defense to this charge if the check was post-dated.
832.041. Stopping payment with intent to defraud
(1) Whoever, with intent to defraud any person shall, in person or by agent, make, draw, utter, deliver, or give any check, draft, or written order for the payment of money upon any bank, person, or corporation and secure from such person goods or services for or on account of such check, draft, or written order, whether such goods or services are valued at the amount of such check, draft, or written order or at a greater or lesser value, and who shall, pursuant to and in furtherance of such intent to defraud, stop payment on such check, draft, or written order, shall be deemed to be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if the value of the goods or services secured for or on account of such check, draft, or written order is $150 or more; and if the value of the goods or services secured for or on account of such check, draft, or written order is less than $150, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(2) This section shall be taken to be cumulative and shall not be construed to repeal any other statute now in effect.
832.05. Giving worthless checks, drafts, and debit card orders; penalty; duty of drawee; evidence; costs; complaint form
(1) Purpose.—The purpose of this section is to remedy the evil of giving checks, drafts, bills of exchange, debit card orders, and other orders on banks without first providing funds in or credit with the depositories on which the same are made or drawn to pay and satisfy the same, which tends to create the circulation of worthless checks, drafts, bills of exchange, debit card orders, and other orders on banks, bad banking, check kiting, and a mischief to trade and commerce.
(2) Worthless checks, drafts, or debit card orders; penalty.—
(a) It is unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to draw, make, utter, issue, or deliver to another any check, draft, or other written order on any bank or depository, or to use a debit card, for the payment of money or its equivalent, knowing at the time of the drawing, making, uttering, issuing, or delivering such check or draft, or at the time of using such debit card, that the maker or drawer thereof has not sufficient funds on deposit in or credit with such bank or depository with which to pay the same on presentation; except that this section does not apply to any check when the payee or holder knows or has been expressly notified prior to the drawing or uttering of the check, or has reason to believe, that the drawer did not have on deposit or to his credit with the drawee sufficient funds to ensure payment as aforesaid, nor does this section apply to any postdated check.
(b) A violation of the provisions of this subsection constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083, unless the check, draft, debit card order, or other written order drawn, made, uttered, issued, or delivered is in the amount of $150, or its equivalent, or more and the payee or a subsequent holder thereof receives something of value herefore. In that event, the violation constitutes a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3) Cashing or depositing item with intent to defraud; penalty.—
(a) It is unlawful for any person, by act or common scheme, to cash or deposit any item, as defined in s. 674.104(1)(i), in any bank or depository with intent to defraud.
(b) A violation of the provisions of this subsection constitutes a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(4) Obtaining property or services in return for worthless checks, drafts, or debit card orders; penalty.—
(a) It is unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to obtain any services, goods, wares, or other things of value by means of a check, draft, or other written order upon any bank, person, firm, or corporation, knowing at the time of the making, drawing, uttering, issuing, or delivering of such check or draft that the maker thereof has not sufficient funds on deposit in or credit with such bank or depository with which to pay the same upon presentation. However, no crime may be charged in respect to the giving of any such check or draft or other written order when the payee knows, has been expressly notified, or has reason to believe that the drawer did not have on deposit or to his credit with the drawee sufficient funds to ensure payment thereof. A payee does not have reason to believe a payor does not have sufficient funds to ensure payment of a check solely because the payor has previously issued a worthless check to him.
(b) It is unlawful for any person to use a debit card to obtain money, goods, services, or anything else of value knowing at the time of such use that he does not have sufficient funds on deposit with which to pay for the same or that the value thereof exceeds the amount of credit which is available to him through an overdraft financing agreement or prearranged line of credit which is accessible by the use of the card.
© A violation of the provisions of this subsection, if the check, draft, other written order, or debit card order is for an amount less than $150 or its equivalent, constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. A violation of the provisions of this subsection, if the check, draft, other written order, or debit card order is in the amount of $150, or its equivalent, or more, constitutes a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(5) Payment no defense.—Payment of a dishonored check, draft, bill of exchange, or other order does not constitute a defense or ground for dismissal of charges brought under this section.
(6) “Credit,” “debit card” defined.—
(a) The word “credit” as used herein shall be construed to mean an arrangement or understanding with the drawee for the payment of such check, draft, or other written order.
(b) As used in this section, the term “debit card” means a card, code, or other device, other than a check, draft, or similar paper instrument, by the use of which a person may order, instruct, or authorize a financial institution to debit a demand deposit, savings deposit, or other asset account.
(7) Reason for dishonor, duty of drawee.—It is the duty of the drawee of any check, draft, or other written order, before refusing to pay the same to the holder thereof upon presentation, to cause to be written, printed, or stamped in plain language thereon or attached thereto the reason for the drawee’s dishonor or refusal to pay it. In any prosecution under this section, the introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check, draft, or other written order having the drawee’s refusal to pay stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, with the reason herefore as aforesaid, is prima facie evidence of the making or uttering of such check, draft, or other written order, of the due presentation to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the reasons written, stamped, or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check, draft, or other written order. As against the maker or drawer thereof, the withdrawing from deposit with the drawee named in the check, draft, or other written order of the funds on deposit with such drawee necessary to ensure payment of such check, draft, or other written order upon presentation within a reasonable time after negotiation or the drawing, making, uttering, or delivering of a check, draft, or written order, payment of which is refused by the drawee, is prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds in or credit with such drawee. However, if it is determined at the trial in a prosecution hereunder that the payee of any such check, draft, or written order, at the time of accepting such check, draft, or written order, had knowledge of or reason to believe that the drawer of such check, draft, or other written order did not have sufficient funds on deposit in or credit with such drawee, then the payee instituting such criminal prosecution shall be assessed all costs of court incurred in connection with such prosecution.
(8) Costs.—When a prosecution is initiated under this section before any committing magistrate, the party applying for the warrant shall be held liable for costs accruing in the event the case is dismissed for want of prosecution. No costs shall be charged to the county in such dismissed cases.
(9) State attorneys; worthless checks; form of complaint.—The state attorneys of Florida shall collectively promulgate a single form to be used in all judicial circuits by persons reporting a violation of this chapter.
832.07. Prima facie evidence of intent; identity
(1) Intent.—
(a) In any prosecution or action under this chapter, the making, drawing, uttering, or delivery of a check, draft, or order, payment of which is refused by the drawee because of lack of funds or credit, shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud or knowledge of insufficient funds in, or credit with, such bank, banking institution, trust company, or other depository, unless such maker or drawer, or someone for him, shall have paid the holder thereof the amount due thereon, together with a service charge not to exceed the service fees authorized under s. 832.08(5) or an amount of up to 5 percent of the face amount of the check, whichever is greater, within 7 days after receiving written notice that such check, draft, or order has not been paid to the holder thereof, and bank fees incurred by the holder. In the event of legal action for recovery, the maker or drawer may be additionally liable for court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. Notice mailed by certified or registered mail, evidenced by return receipt, to the address printed on the check or given at the time of issuance shall be deemed sufficient and equivalent to notice having been received by the maker or drawer, whether such notice shall be returned undelivered or not. The form of such notice shall be substantially as follows:”You are hereby notified that a check, numbered ___, in the face amount of $___, issued by you on ___(date)___, drawn upon ___(name of bank)___, and payable to ___, has been dishonored. Pursuant to Florida law, you have 7 days from receipt of this notice to tender payment of the full amount of such check plus a service charge of $25, if the face value does not exceed $50, $30, if the face value exceeds $50 but does not exceed $300, $40, if the face value exceeds $300, or an amount of up to 5 percent of the face amount of the check, whichever is greater, the total amount due being $___ and ___ cents. Unless this amount is paid in full within the time specified above, the holder of such check may turn over the dishonored check and all other available information relating to this incident to the state attorney for criminal prosecution. You may be additionally liable in a civil action for triple the amount of the check, but in no case less than $50, together with the amount of the check, a service charge, court costs, reasonable attorney fees, and incurred bank fees, as provided in s. 68.065.”Subsequent persons receiving a check, draft, or order from the original payee or a successor endorsee have the same rights that the original payee has against the maker of the instrument, provided such subsequent persons give notice in a substantially similar form to that provided above. Subsequent persons providing such notice shall be immune from civil liability for the giving of such notice and for proceeding under the forms of such notice, so long as the maker of the instrument has the same defenses against these subsequent persons as against the original payee. However, the remedies available under this section may be exercised only by one party in interest.
(b) When a check is drawn on a bank in which the maker or drawer has no account or a closed account, it shall be presumed that such check was issued with intent to defraud, and the notice requirement set forth in this section shall be waived.
(2) Identity.—
(a) In any prosecution or action under the provisions of this chapter, a check, draft, or order for which the information required in paragraph (b), paragraph (d), paragraph (e), or paragraph (f) is available at the time of issuance constitutes prima facie evidence of the identity of the person issuing the check, draft, or order and that such person is authorized to draw upon the named account.
(b) To establish this prima facie evidence:
1. The driver’s license number or state identification number, specifying the state of issuance of the person presenting the check must be written on the check; or
2. The following information regarding the identity of the person presenting the check must be obtained by the person accepting such check: The presenter’s full name, residence address, home phone number, business phone number, place of employment, sex, date of birth, height and race. This information shall be written upon the check.
© The information required in subparagraph (b)2. May be provided by either of two methods:
1. The information may be recorded on the check; or
2. The number of a check-cashing identification card issued by the accepter of the check may be recorded on the check. In order to be used to establish identity, such check-cashing identification card may not be issued until the information required in subparagraph (b)2. Has been placed on file with the accepter of the check.
(d) If a check is received by a payee through the mail or by delivery to a representative of the payee, the prima facie evidence referred to in paragraph (a) may be established by presenting the original contract, order, or request for services that the check purports to pay for, bearing the signature of the person who signed the check, or by presenting a copy of the information required in subparagraph (b)2. Which is on file with the accepter of the check together with the signature of the person presenting the check.
(e) If a check is received by a payee and the drawer or maker has a check-cashing identification card on file with the payee, the prima facie evidence referred to in paragraph (a) may be established by presenting the signature found on the check-cashing identification card bearing the signature of the person who signed the check.
(f) If a check is received by the Department of Revenue through the mail or by delivery to a representative of the Department of Revenue, the prima facie evidence referred to in paragraph (a) may be established by presenting the original tax return, certificate, license, application for certificate or license, or other document relating to amounts owed by that person or taxpayer which the check purports to pay for, bearing the signature of the person who signed the check, or by presenting a copy of the information required in subparagraph (b)2. Which is on file with the accepter of the check together with the signature of the person presenting the check. The use of taxpayer information for purposes of establishing the identity of a person pursuant to this paragraph shall be considered a use of such information for official purposes.
832.08. State attorney bad check diversion program; fees for collections
(1) In any judicial circuit where a bad check diversion program is not in existence as of October 1, 1986, the state attorney may establish such a program, either within his office or through an independent contractor, for the purpose of diverting from prosecution certain persons accused of a violation of s. 832.04, s. 832.041, s. 832.05, or s. 832.06. The use of such a diversion program shall not affect the authority of the state attorney to prosecute any person for any such violation.
(2) Upon receipt of a complaint alleging any such violation, the state attorney shall determine if the case is appropriate for referral to the bad check diversion program by considering:
(a) The amount of the bad check.
(b) The prior criminal record of the defendant.
© Whether or not there are other bad check complaints currently pending against the defendant.
(d) The strength of the evidence of intent to defraud the victim.
(3) Upon referral of a complaint to the bad check diversion program, the state attorney shall forward a notice of the complaint by mail to the defendant. The notice shall contain all of the following:
(a) The date and amount of the check.
(b) The name of the payee.
© The date before which the defendant must contact the bad check office concerning the complaint.
(d) A statement of the penalty for issuance of a bad check.
(4) If the state attorney allows the defendant to enter into a diversion program, the state attorney shall enter into a written agreement with the defendant to divert him on bad check charges. The diversion agreement shall include all of the following conditions, which must be accepted by the defendant:
(a) Attendance at a program designed to assist and educate persons who have violated the provisions of this chapter.
(b) Full restitution on the check.
© Full payment of fees due under subsection (5).
(d) Any individual who does not fulfill the agreements for diversion could then be prosecuted under the appropriate section.
(e) A knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a speedy trial for the period of his diversion.
(5) To fund the diversion program, the state attorney may collect a fee on each check that is collected through his office, whether it is collected through prosecution or through the diversion program. However, the state attorney may not collect such a fee on any check collected through a diversion program which was in existence in another office prior to October 1, 1986. A fee may be collected by an office operating such a preexisting diversion program for the purpose of funding such program. The amount of the fee for each check shall not exceed:
(a) Twenty-five dollars, if the face value does not exceed $50.
(b) Thirty dollars, if the face value is more than $50 but does not exceed $300.
(c) Forty dollars, if the face value is more than $300.
Battery on a LEO (Law Enforcement Officer)
A battery on an undercover police officer can still count as battery on a Law Enforcement officer if the undercover officer identified his or himself as a police officer.
OFFICER WAS OFF-DUTY AND OUTSIDE JURISDICTION
Ruggles v. State, 757 So.2d 632(Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
OFFICER IN PLAIN CLOTHES
Taylor v. State, 410 So.2d 1358(Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
784.07. Assault or battery of law enforcement officers, firefighters, emergency medical care providers, public transit employees or agents, or other specified officers; reclassification of offenses; minimum sentences
(1) As used in this section, the term:
(a) “Law enforcement officer” includes a law enforcement officer, a correctional officer, a correctional probation officer, a part-time law enforcement officer, a part-time correctional officer, an auxiliary law enforcement officer, and an auxiliary correctional officer, as those terms are respectively defined in s. 943.10, and any county probation officer; employee or agent of the Department of Corrections who supervises or provides services to inmates; officer of the Parole Commission; and law enforcement personnel of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, the Department of Environmental Protection, or the Department of Law Enforcement.
(b) “Firefighter” means any person employed by any public employer of this state whose duty it is to extinguish fires; to protect life or property; or to enforce municipal, county, and state fire prevention codes, as well as any law pertaining to the prevention and control of fires.
(c) “Emergency medical care provider” means an ambulance driver, emergency medical technician, paramedic, registered nurse, physician as defined in s. 401.23, medical director as defined in s. 401.23, or any person authorized by an emergency medical service licensed under chapter 401 who is engaged in the performance of his or her duties. The term “emergency medical care provider” also includes physicians, employees, agents, or volunteers of hospitals as defined in chapter 395, who are employed, under contract, or otherwise authorized by a hospital to perform duties directly associated with the care and treatment rendered by the hospital’s emergency department or the security thereof.
(d) “Public transit employees or agents” means bus operators, train operators, revenue collectors, security personnel, equipment maintenance personnel, or field supervisors, who are employees or agents of a transit agency as described in s. 812.015(1)(l).
(2) Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer, a firefighter, an emergency medical care provider, a traffic accident investigation officer as described in s. 316.640, a traffic infraction enforcement officer as described in s. 316.640, a parking enforcement specialist as defined in s. 316.640, or a security officer employed by the board of trustees of a community college, while the officer, firefighter, emergency medical care provider, intake officer, traffic accident investigation officer, traffic infraction enforcement officer, parking enforcement specialist, public transit employee or agent, or security officer is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties, the offense for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows:
(a) In the case of assault, from a misdemeanor of the second degree to a misdemeanor of the first degree.
(b) In the case of battery, from a misdemeanor of the first degree to a felony of the third degree.
(c) In the case of aggravated assault, from a felony of the third degree to a felony of the second degree. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any person convicted of aggravated assault upon a law enforcement officer shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 3 years.
(d) In the case of aggravated battery, from a felony of the second degree to a felony of the first degree. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any person convicted of aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 5 years.
(3) Any person who is convicted of a battery under paragraph (2)(b) and, during the commission of the offense, such person possessed:
(a) A “firearm” or “destructive device” as those terms are defined in s. 790.001, shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 3 years.
(b) A semiautomatic firearm and its high-capacity detachable box magazine, as defined in s. 775.087(3), or a machine gun as defined in s. 790.001, shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 8 years.
Notwithstanding s. 948.01, adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld, and the defendant is not eligible for statutory gain-time under s. 944.275 or any form of discretionary early release, other than pardon or executive clemency, or conditional medical release under s. 947.149, prior to serving the minimum sentence.
Resisting Arrest With Violence
843.01 Resisting officer with violence to his or her person.—
Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any officer as defined in s. 943.10(1), (2), (3), (6), (7), (8), or (9); member of the Parole Commission or any administrative aide or supervisor employed by the commission; parole and probation supervisor; county probation officer; personnel or representative of the Department of Law Enforcement; or other person legally authorized to execute process in the execution of legal process or in the lawful execution of any legal duty, by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer or legally authorized person, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
776.051 Use of force in resisting arrest or making an arrest or in the execution of a legal duty; prohibition.–
(1) A person is not justified in the use of force to resist an arrest by a law enforcement officer, or to resist a law enforcement officer who is engaged in the execution of a legal duty, if the law enforcement officer was acting in good faith and he or she is known, or reasonably appears, to be a law enforcement officer.
(2) A law enforcement officer, or any person whom the officer has summoned or directed to assist him or her, is not justified in the use of force if the arrest or execution of a legal duty is unlawful and known by him or her to be unlawful.
Robbery
812.13(1), Robbery
“Robbery” means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.
812.13(3)(a), In the course of committing the Robbery
An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing the robbery” if it occurs in an attempt to commit robbery or in flight after the attempt or commission.
812.13(3)(b), In the course of the Taking
An act shall be deemed “in the course of the taking” if it occurs either prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if it and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events.
812.13(2)(c), Simple Robbery, No Weapon
If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried no firearm, deadly weapon, or other weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the second degree (see this article for punishment).
812.13(2)(b), Armed Robbery with a Weapon
If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree (see this article for punishment).
Firearm Offenses
Below are some Minimum-Mandatory Sentences for crimes committed with Firearms.
775.087 Possession or use of weapon; aggravated battery; felony reclassification; minimum sentence.–
(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, whenever a person is charged with a felony, except a felony in which the use of a weapon or firearm is an essential element, and during the commission of such felony the defendant carries, displays, uses, threatens to use, or attempts to use any weapon or firearm, or during the commission of such felony the defendant commits an aggravated battery, the felony for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows:
(a) In the case of a felony of the first degree, to a life felony.
(b) In the case of a felony of the second degree, to a felony of the first degree.
(c) In the case of a felony of the third degree, to a felony of the second degree.
For purposes of sentencing under chapter 921 and determining incentive gain-time eligibility under chapter 944, a felony offense which is reclassified under this section is ranked one level above the ranking under s. 921.0022 or s. 921.0023 of the felony offense committed.
(2)(a)1. Any person who is convicted of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony, regardless of whether the use of a weapon is an element of the felony, and the conviction was for: a. Murder; b. Sexual battery; c. Robbery; d. Burglary; e. Arson; f. Aggravated assault; g. Aggravated battery; h. Kidnapping; i. Escape; j. Aircraft piracy; k. Aggravated child abuse; l. Aggravated abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult; m. Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; n. Carjacking; o. Home-invasion robbery; p. Aggravated stalking; q. Trafficking in cannabis, trafficking in cocaine, capital importation of cocaine, trafficking in illegal drugs, capital importation of illegal drugs, trafficking in phencyclidine, capital importation of phencyclidine, trafficking in methaqualone, capital importation of methaqualone, trafficking in amphetamine, capital importation of amphetamine, trafficking in flunitrazepam, trafficking in gamma-hydroxybutyric acid (GHB), trafficking in 1,4-Butanediol, trafficking in Phenethylamines, or other violation of s. 893.135(1); or r. Possession of a firearm by a felon and during the commission of the offense, such person actually possessed a “firearm” or “destructive device” as those terms are defined in s. 790.001, shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 10 years, except that a person who is convicted for aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by a felon, or burglary of a conveyance shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 3 years if such person possessed a “firearm” or “destructive device” during the commission of the offense. 2. Any person who is convicted of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony listed in sub-subparagraphs (a)1.a.-q., regardless of whether the use of a weapon is an element of the felony, and during the course of the commission of the felony such person discharged a “firearm” or “destructive device” as defined in s. 790.001 shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 20 years. 3. Any person who is convicted of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony listed in sub-subparagraphs (a)1.a.-q., regardless of whether the use of a weapon is an element of the felony, and during the course of the commission of the felony such person discharged a “firearm” or “destructive device” as defined in s. 790.001 and, as the result of the discharge, death or great bodily harm was inflicted upon any person, the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison. (b) Subparagraph (a)1., subparagraph (a)2., or subparagraph (a)3. does not prevent a court from imposing a longer sentence of incarceration as authorized by law in addition to the minimum mandatory sentence, or from imposing a sentence of death pursuant to other applicable law. Subparagraph (a)1., subparagraph (a)2., or subparagraph (a)3. does not authorize a court to impose a lesser sentence than otherwise required by law. Notwithstanding s. 948.01, adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld, and the defendant is not eligible for statutory gain-time under s. 944.275 or any form of discretionary early release, other than pardon or executive clemency, or conditional medical release under s. 947.149, prior to serving the minimum sentence. (c) If the minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this section exceed the maximum sentences authorized by s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921, then the mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed. If the mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment pursuant to this section are less than the sentences that could be imposed as authorized by s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921, then the sentence imposed by the court must include the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment as required in this section. (d) It is the intent of the Legislature that offenders who actually possess, carry, display, use, threaten to use, or attempt to use firearms or destructive devices be punished to the fullest extent of the law, and the minimum terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this subsection shall be imposed for each qualifying felony count for which the person is convicted. The court shall impose any term of imprisonment provided for in this subsection consecutively to any other term of imprisonment imposed for any other felony offense. (3)(a)1. Any person who is convicted of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony, regardless of whether the use of a firearm is an element of the felony, and the conviction was for: a. Murder; b. Sexual battery; c. Robbery; d. Burglary; e. Arson; f. Aggravated assault; g. Aggravated battery; h. Kidnapping; i. Escape; j. Sale, manufacture, delivery, or intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver any controlled substance; k. Aircraft piracy; l. Aggravated child abuse; m. Aggravated abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult; n. Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; o. Carjacking; p. Home-invasion robbery; q. Aggravated stalking; or r. Trafficking in cannabis, trafficking in cocaine, capital importation of cocaine, trafficking in illegal drugs, capital importation of illegal drugs, trafficking in phencyclidine, capital importation of phencyclidine, trafficking in methaqualone, capital importation of methaqualone, trafficking in amphetamine, capital importation of amphetamine, trafficking in flunitrazepam, trafficking in gamma-hydroxybutyric acid (GHB), trafficking in 1,4-Butanediol, trafficking in Phenethylamines, or other violation of s. 893.135(1); and during the commission of the offense, such person possessed a semiautomatic firearm and its high-capacity detachable box magazine or a machine gun as defined in s. 790.001, shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years. 2. Any person who is convicted of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony listed in subparagraph (a)1., regardless of whether the use of a weapon is an element of the felony, and during the course of the commission of the felony such person discharged a semiautomatic firearm and its high-capacity box magazine or a “machine gun” as defined in s. 790.001 shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 20 years. 3. Any person who is convicted of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony listed in subparagraph (a)1., regardless of whether the use of a weapon is an element of the felony, and during the course of the commission of the felony such person discharged a semiautomatic firearm and its high-capacity box magazine or a “machine gun” as defined in s. 790.001 and, as the result of the discharge, death or great bodily harm was inflicted upon any person, the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison. (b) Subparagraph (a)1., subparagraph (a)2., or subparagraph (a)3. does not prevent a court from imposing a longer sentence of incarceration as authorized by law in addition to the minimum mandatory sentence, or from imposing a sentence of death pursuant to other applicable law. Subparagraph (a)1., subparagraph (a)2., or subparagraph (a)3. does not authorize a court to impose a lesser sentence than otherwise required by law. Notwithstanding s. 948.01, adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld, and the defendant is not eligible for statutory gain-time under s. 944.275 or any form of discretionary early release, other than pardon or executive clemency, or conditional medical release under s. 947.149, prior to serving the minimum sentence. (c) If the minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this section exceed the maximum sentences authorized by s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921, then the mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed. If the mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment pursuant to this section are less than the sentences that could be imposed as authorized by s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921, then the sentence imposed by the court must include the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment as required in this section. (d) It is the intent of the Legislature that offenders who possess, carry, display, use, threaten to use, or attempt to use a semiautomatic firearm and its high-capacity detachable box magazine or a machine gun as defined in s. 790.001 be punished to the fullest extent of the law, and the minimum terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this subsection shall be imposed for each qualifying felony count for which the person is convicted. The court shall impose any term of imprisonment provided for in this subsection consecutively to any other term of imprisonment imposed for any other felony offense. (e) As used in this subsection, the term: 1. “High-capacity detachable box magazine” means any detachable box magazine, for use in a semiautomatic firearm, which is capable of being loaded with more than 20 centerfire cartridges. 2. “Semiautomatic firearm” means a firearm which is capable of firing a series of rounds by separate successive depressions of the trigger and which uses the energy of discharge to perform a portion of the operating cycle. (4) For purposes of imposition of minimum mandatory sentencing provisions of this section, with respect to a firearm, the term “possession” is defined as carrying it on the person. Possession may also be proven by demonstrating that the defendant had the firearm within immediate physical reach with ready access with the intent to use the firearm during the commission of the offense, if proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (5) In every case in which a law enforcement agency based a criminal charge on facts demonstrating that the defendant met the criteria in subparagraph (2)(a)1., subparagraph (2)(a)2., or subparagraph (2)(a)3. or subparagraph (3)(a)1., subparagraph (3)(a)2., or subparagraph (3)(a)3. and in which the defendant did not receive the mandatory penalty, the state attorney must place in the court file a memorandum explaining why the minimum mandatory penalty was not imposed. (6) This section does not apply to law enforcement officers or to United States military personnel who are performing their lawful duties or who are traveling to or from their places of employment or assignment to perform their lawful duties.
Assault and Battery
Though Assault and Battery are often lumped together and mentioned together in conversation, they are actually distinct and different crimes. An assault does not have to occur for a battery to be committed and likewise a battery does not have to occur for an assault to be committed.
In plain English, a battery is any unwanted and unjustified touching or intentionally causing bodily harm to another, whereas an assault is when a person uses words, actions, and weapons to put another in imminent fear of harm. It is the intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent (Florida Statutes 784.011)
An Aggravated Assault occurs when a weapon is used as an instrument to create a fear in another that his safety was being endangered.
An Aggravated Battery occurs if a person is seriously injured or hit with a weapon even if the injury is minor.
No actual touching necessary to constitute assault or battery
A person can be arrested and convicted of battery, even if the victim was never touched and if something the person is holding or is inside of is touched. As long ago as 1784, the United States Supreme Court held that even striking one’s cane and not the person himself may constitute a battery (Respublica v. DeLongchamps (1784, U.S. Supreme Court) ).
In 1984, Florida’s 2nd District Court of Appeals upheld one Defendant’s conviction of aggravated battery, although the defendant’s blade stabbed only the money bag that the victim was holding, and not the victim himself (Malczewski v. State, 444 So.2d 1096 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1984)).
As you can see, the law defines what is and is not assault and battery. Not every accusation of assault and battery has a factual or legal basis. Let me put my criminal trial expertise to work for you, reviewing your facts against current law, helping to make sure that your rights are protected to the fullest extent of the law, and ensuring that your side of the story gets heard.
Other assault and battery cases of note:
Grabbed person’s purse, but not the person, Nash v. State, 766 So.2d 310 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
“The word “person” in the statute includes an object that has such an intimate connection with the person as to be regarded as a part or extension of the person, such as clothing or an object held by the person.” Malczewski v. State, 444 So.2d 1096, 1099 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
Hitting a car with person inside, but did not touch or strike person, Clark v. State, 783 So.2d 967 (Fla. 2001)