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Misdemeanor

Traffic and Driving

 

____________________________
Geoffrey P. Golub has almost 20 years experience handling the legal matters of his clients.   His Melbourne, Florida
office serves the needs of clients in Brevard, Indian River, Orlando (Orange County), and other Central Florida locations.
His office can be reached at 772-757-6848.

 

Out-of-state Driver’s License Myth

If you do not live in Florida and do not work in Florida and your privilege to drive in Florida is not suspended then you can use a valid out-of-state Driver’s License.  Otherwise you cannot use an out-of-state Driver’s License.

 

322.01  Definitions

(34)  “Resident” means a person who has his or her principal place of domicile in this state for a period of more than 6 consecutive months, has registered to vote, has made a statement of domicile pursuant to s. 222.17, or has filed for homestead tax exemption on property in this state.

322.031  Nonresident; when license required.

(1)  In every case in which a nonresident, except a nonresident migrant or seasonal farm worker as defined in s. 316.003(61), accepts employment or engages in any trade, profession, or occupation in this state or enters his or her children to be educated in the public schools of this state, such nonresident shall, within 30 days after the commencement of such employment or education, be required to obtain a Florida driver’s license if such nonresident operates a motor vehicle on the highways of this state. The spouse or dependent child of such nonresident shall also be required to obtain a Florida driver’s license within that 30-day period prior to operating a motor vehicle on the highways of this state.

(2)  A member of the United States Armed Forces on active duty in this state shall not be required to obtain a Florida driver’s license under this section solely because he or she enters his or her children to be educated in the public schools of this state if he or she has a valid military driving permit or a valid driver’s license issued by another state.

(3)  A nonresident who is domiciled in another state and who commutes into this state in order to work shall not be required to obtain a Florida driver’s license under this section solely because he or she has accepted employment or engages in any trade, profession, or occupation in this state if he or she has a valid driver’s license issued by another state. Further, any person who is enrolled as a student in a college or university and who is a nonresident but is in this state for a period of up to 6 months engaged in a work-study program for which academic credits are earned from a college whose credits or degrees are accepted for credit by at least three accredited institutions of higher learning, as defined in s. 1005.02, shall not be required to obtain a Florida driver’s license for the duration of the work-study program if such person has a valid driver’s license issued by another state. Any nonresident who is enrolled as a full-time student in any such institution of higher learning is also exempt from the requirement of obtaining a Florida driver’s license for the duration of such enrollment.

(4)  A nonresident who is at least 21 years of age and who has in his or her immediate possession a valid commercial driver’s license issued in substantial compliance with the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 may operate a motor vehicle of the type permitted by his or her license to be operated in this state.

322.04  Persons exempt from obtaining driver’s license.

(1)  The following persons are exempt from obtaining a driver’s license:

(a)  Any employee of the United States Government, while operating a noncommercial motor vehicle owned by or leased to the United States Government and being operated on official business.

(b)  Any person while driving or operating any road machine, farm tractor, or implement of husbandry temporarily operated or moved on a highway.

(c)  A nonresident who is at least 16 years of age and who has in his or her immediate possession a valid noncommercial driver’s license issued to the nonresident in his or her home state or country, may operate a motor vehicle of the type for which a Class E driver’s license is required in this state.

(d)  A nonresident who is at least 18 years of age and who has in his or her immediate possession a valid noncommercial driver’s license issued to the nonresident in his or her home state or country may operate a motor vehicle, other than a commercial motor vehicle, in this state.

(e)  Any person operating a golf cart, as defined in s. 320.01, which is operated in accordance with the provisions of s. 316.212.

(2)  The provisions of this section do not apply to any person to whom s. 322.031 applies.

(3)Any person working for a firm under contract to the United States Government, whose residence is without this state and whose main point of employment is without this state may drive a noncommercial vehicle on the public roads of this state for periods up to 60 days while in this state on temporary duty, provided such person has a valid driver’s license from the state of such person’s residence.

Who Needs One?

If you live in Florida and want to drive a motor vehicle on public streets and highways.

If you move to Florida and have a valid license from another state, you must get a Florida license within 30 days of becoming a resident. You are considered a resident of Florida if you:

Enroll your children in public school, or

Register to vote, or

File for a homestead exemption, or

Accept employment, or

Reside in Florida for more than six consecutive months.

Who Does Not Need One?

The following persons may drive in Florida without a Florida driver license, if they have a valid license from another state or country:

Any non-resident who is at least 16 years old.

Persons employed by the United States government driving a United States government motor vehicle on official business.

Any non-resident working for a firm on a contract for the United States government. (This exemption is only for 60 days.)

Any non-resident attending college in Florida.

Persons who drive only vehicles like farm tractors or road machines temporarily on the highway may drive without a license.

A licensed driver who lives in another state and travels regularly between his home and work in Florida.

Non-resident migrant farm workers even though they are employed or place children in the public schools, providing they have a valid license from their home state.

Members of the Armed Forces stationed in Florida and their dependents, with these exceptions:

Service member or spouse claims homestead exemption (All drivers in family must obtain Florida licenses),

Service member becomes employed (All drivers in family must obtain Florida licenses),

Spouse becomes employed (Spouse and children who drive must obtain Florida licenses),

Child becomes employed (Only employed child who drives must obtain Florida license)

 

Bad (Worthless) Checks

A bad check of $150.00 or more is a felony.  Stopping payment on a check is only a crime if it was stopped with the intent to defraud someone.  It is a defense to this charge if the check was post-dated.

832.041. Stopping payment with intent to defraud

(1) Whoever, with intent to defraud any person shall, in person or by agent, make, draw, utter, deliver, or give any check, draft, or written order for the payment of money upon any bank, person, or corporation and secure from such person goods or services for or on account of such check, draft, or written order, whether such goods or services are valued at the amount of such check, draft, or written order or at a greater or lesser value, and who shall, pursuant to and in furtherance of such intent to defraud, stop payment on such check, draft, or written order, shall be deemed to be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if the value of the goods or services secured for or on account of such check, draft, or written order is $150 or more;  and if the value of the goods or services secured for or on account of such check, draft, or written order is less than $150, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

(2) This section shall be taken to be cumulative and shall not be construed to repeal any other statute now in effect.

832.05. Giving worthless checks, drafts, and debit card orders;   penalty;  duty of drawee;  evidence;  costs;  complaint form

(1) Purpose.—The purpose of this section is to remedy the evil of giving checks, drafts, bills of exchange, debit card orders, and other orders on banks without first providing funds in or credit with the depositories on which the same are made or drawn to pay and satisfy the same, which tends to create the circulation of worthless checks, drafts, bills of exchange, debit card orders, and other orders on banks, bad banking, check kiting, and a mischief to trade and commerce.

(2) Worthless checks, drafts, or debit card orders;  penalty.—

(a) It is unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to draw, make, utter, issue, or deliver to another any check, draft, or other written order on any bank or depository, or to use a debit card, for the payment of money or its equivalent, knowing at the time of the drawing, making, uttering, issuing, or delivering such check or draft, or at the time of using such debit card, that the maker or drawer thereof has not sufficient funds on deposit in or credit with such bank or depository with which to pay the same on presentation;  except that this section does not apply to any check when the payee or holder knows or has been expressly notified prior to the drawing or uttering of the check, or has reason to believe, that the drawer did not have on deposit or to his credit with the drawee sufficient funds to ensure payment as aforesaid, nor does this section apply to any postdated check.

(b) A violation of the provisions of this subsection constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083, unless the check, draft, debit card order, or other written order drawn, made, uttered, issued, or delivered is in the amount of $150, or its equivalent, or more and the payee or a subsequent holder thereof receives something of value herefore.  In that event, the violation constitutes a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(3) Cashing or depositing item with intent to defraud;  penalty.—

(a) It is unlawful for any person, by act or common scheme, to cash or deposit any item, as defined in s. 674.104(1)(i), in any bank or depository with intent to defraud.

(b) A violation of the provisions of this subsection constitutes a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(4) Obtaining property or services in return for worthless checks, drafts, or debit card orders;  penalty.—

(a) It is unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to obtain any services, goods, wares, or other things of value by means of a check, draft, or other written order upon any bank, person, firm, or corporation, knowing at the time of the making, drawing, uttering, issuing, or delivering of such check or draft that the maker thereof has not sufficient funds on deposit in or credit with such bank or depository with which to pay the same upon presentation.  However, no crime may be charged in respect to the giving of any such check or draft or other written order when the payee knows, has been expressly notified, or has reason to believe that the drawer did not have on deposit or to his credit with the drawee sufficient funds to ensure payment thereof.  A payee does not have reason to believe a payor does not have sufficient funds to ensure payment of a check solely because the payor has previously issued a worthless check to him.

(b) It is unlawful for any person to use a debit card to obtain money, goods, services, or anything else of value knowing at the time of such use that he does not have sufficient funds on deposit with which to pay for the same or that the value thereof exceeds the amount of credit which is available to him through an overdraft financing agreement or prearranged line of credit which is accessible by the use of the card.

© A violation of the provisions of this subsection, if the check, draft, other written order, or debit card order is for an amount less than $150 or its equivalent, constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.  A violation of the provisions of this subsection, if the check, draft, other written order, or debit card order is in the amount of $150, or its equivalent, or more, constitutes a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(5) Payment no defense.—Payment of a dishonored check, draft, bill of exchange, or other order does not constitute a defense or ground for dismissal of charges brought under this section.

(6) “Credit,” “debit card” defined.—

(a) The word “credit” as used herein shall be construed to mean an arrangement or understanding with the drawee for the payment of such check, draft, or other written order.

(b) As used in this section, the term “debit card” means a card, code, or other device, other than a check, draft, or similar paper instrument, by the use of which a person may order, instruct, or authorize a financial institution to debit a demand deposit, savings deposit, or other asset account.

(7) Reason for dishonor, duty of drawee.—It is the duty of the drawee of any check, draft, or other written order, before refusing to pay the same to the holder thereof upon presentation, to cause to be written, printed, or stamped in plain language thereon or attached thereto the reason for the drawee’s dishonor or refusal to pay it.  In any prosecution under this section, the introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check, draft, or other written order having the drawee’s refusal to pay stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, with the reason herefore as aforesaid, is prima facie evidence of the making or uttering of such check, draft, or other written order, of the due presentation to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the reasons written, stamped, or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check, draft, or other written order.  As against the maker or drawer thereof, the withdrawing from deposit with the drawee named in the check, draft, or other written order of the funds on deposit with such drawee necessary to ensure payment of such check, draft, or other written order upon presentation within a reasonable time after negotiation or the drawing, making, uttering, or delivering of a check, draft, or written order, payment of which is refused by the drawee, is prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds in or credit with such drawee.  However, if it is determined at the trial in a prosecution hereunder that the payee of any such check, draft, or written order, at the time of accepting such check, draft, or written order, had knowledge of or reason to believe that the drawer of such check, draft, or other written order did not have sufficient funds on deposit in or credit with such drawee, then the payee instituting such criminal prosecution shall be assessed all costs of court incurred in connection with such prosecution.

(8) Costs.—When a prosecution is initiated under this section before any committing magistrate, the party applying for the warrant shall be held liable for costs accruing in the event the case is dismissed for want of prosecution.  No costs shall be charged to the county in such dismissed cases.

(9) State attorneys;  worthless checks;  form of complaint.—The state attorneys of Florida shall collectively promulgate a single form to be used in all judicial circuits by persons reporting a violation of this chapter.

832.07. Prima facie evidence of intent;  identity

(1) Intent.—

(a) In any prosecution or action under this chapter, the making, drawing, uttering, or delivery of a check, draft, or order, payment of which is refused by the drawee because of lack of funds or credit, shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud or knowledge of insufficient funds in, or credit with, such bank, banking institution, trust company, or other depository, unless such maker or drawer, or someone for him, shall have paid the holder thereof the amount due thereon, together with a service charge not to exceed the service fees authorized under s. 832.08(5) or an amount of up to 5 percent of the face amount of the check, whichever is greater, within 7 days after receiving written notice that such check, draft, or order has not been paid to the holder thereof, and bank fees incurred by the holder. In the event of legal action for recovery, the maker or drawer may be additionally liable for court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.  Notice mailed by certified or registered mail, evidenced by return receipt, to the address printed on the check or given at the time of issuance shall be deemed sufficient and equivalent to notice having been received by the maker or drawer, whether such notice shall be returned undelivered or not. The form of such notice shall be substantially as follows:”You are hereby notified that a check, numbered ___, in the face amount of $___, issued by you on ___(date)___, drawn upon ___(name of bank)___, and payable to ___, has been dishonored.  Pursuant to Florida law, you have 7 days from receipt of this notice to tender payment of the full amount of such check plus a service charge of $25, if the face value does not exceed $50, $30, if the face value exceeds $50 but does not exceed $300, $40, if the face value exceeds $300, or an amount of up to 5 percent of the face amount of the check, whichever is greater, the total amount due being $___ and ___ cents.  Unless this amount is paid in full within the time specified above, the holder of such check may turn over the dishonored check and all other available information relating to this incident to the state attorney for criminal prosecution.  You may be additionally liable in a civil action for triple the amount of the check, but in no case less than $50, together with the amount of the check, a service charge, court costs, reasonable attorney fees, and incurred bank fees, as provided in s. 68.065.”Subsequent persons receiving a check, draft, or order from the original payee or a successor endorsee have the same rights that the original payee has against the maker of the instrument, provided such subsequent persons give notice in a substantially similar form to that provided above.  Subsequent persons providing such notice shall be immune from civil liability for the giving of such notice and for proceeding under the forms of such notice, so long as the maker of the instrument has the same defenses against these subsequent persons as against the original payee.  However, the remedies available under this section may be exercised only by one party in interest.

(b) When a check is drawn on a bank in which the maker or drawer has no account or a closed account, it shall be presumed that such check was issued with intent to defraud, and the notice requirement set forth in this section shall be waived.

(2) Identity.—

(a) In any prosecution or action under the provisions of this chapter, a check, draft, or order for which the information required in paragraph (b), paragraph (d), paragraph (e), or paragraph (f) is available at the time of issuance constitutes prima facie evidence of the identity of the person issuing the check, draft, or order and that such person is authorized to draw upon the named account.

(b) To establish this prima facie evidence:

1. The driver’s license number or state identification number, specifying the state of issuance of the person presenting the check must be written on the check;  or

2. The following information regarding the identity of the person presenting the check must be obtained by the person accepting such check:  The presenter’s full name, residence address, home phone number, business phone number, place of employment, sex, date of birth, height and race.  This information shall be written upon the check.

© The information required in subparagraph (b)2. May be provided by either of two methods:

1. The information may be recorded on the check;  or

2. The number of a check-cashing identification card issued by the accepter of the check may be recorded on the check.  In order to be used to establish identity, such check-cashing identification card may not be issued until the information required in subparagraph (b)2. Has been placed on file with the accepter of the check.

(d) If a check is received by a payee through the mail or by delivery to a representative of the payee, the prima facie evidence referred to in paragraph (a) may be established by presenting the original contract, order, or request for services that the check purports to pay for, bearing the signature of the person who signed the check, or by presenting a copy of the information required in subparagraph (b)2. Which is on file with the accepter of the check together with the signature of the person presenting the check.

(e) If a check is received by a payee and the drawer or maker has a check-cashing identification card on file with the payee, the prima facie evidence referred to in paragraph (a) may be established by presenting the signature found on the check-cashing identification card bearing the signature of the person who signed the check.

(f) If a check is received by the Department of Revenue through the mail or by delivery to a representative of the Department of Revenue, the prima facie evidence referred to in paragraph (a) may be established by presenting the original tax return, certificate, license, application for certificate or license, or other document relating to amounts owed by that person or taxpayer which the check purports to pay for, bearing the signature of the person who signed the check, or by presenting a copy of the information required in subparagraph (b)2. Which is on file with the accepter of the check together with the signature of the person presenting the check.  The use of taxpayer information for purposes of establishing the identity of a person pursuant to this paragraph shall be considered a use of such information for official purposes.

832.08. State attorney bad check diversion program;  fees for collections

(1) In any judicial circuit where a bad check diversion program is not in existence as of October 1, 1986, the state attorney may establish such a program, either within his office or through an independent contractor, for the purpose of diverting from prosecution certain persons accused of a violation of s. 832.04, s. 832.041, s. 832.05, or s. 832.06.  The use of such a diversion program shall not affect the authority of the state attorney to prosecute any person for any such violation.

(2) Upon receipt of a complaint alleging any such violation, the state attorney shall determine if the case is appropriate for referral to the bad check diversion program by considering:

(a) The amount of the bad check.

(b) The prior criminal record of the defendant.

© Whether or not there are other bad check complaints currently pending against the defendant.

(d) The strength of the evidence of intent to defraud the victim.

(3) Upon referral of a complaint to the bad check diversion program, the state attorney shall forward a notice of the complaint by mail to the defendant.  The notice shall contain all of the following:

(a) The date and amount of the check.

(b) The name of the payee.

© The date before which the defendant must contact the bad check office concerning the complaint.

(d) A statement of the penalty for issuance of a bad check.

(4) If the state attorney allows the defendant to enter into a diversion program, the state attorney shall enter into a written agreement with the defendant to divert him on bad check charges.  The diversion agreement shall include all of the following conditions, which must be accepted by the defendant:

(a) Attendance at a program designed to assist and educate persons who have violated the provisions of this chapter.

(b) Full restitution on the check.

© Full payment of fees due under subsection (5).

(d) Any individual who does not fulfill the agreements for diversion could then be prosecuted under the appropriate section.

(e) A knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a speedy trial for the period of his diversion.

(5) To fund the diversion program, the state attorney may collect a fee on each check that is collected through his office, whether it is collected through prosecution or through the diversion program.  However, the state attorney may not collect such a fee on any check collected through a diversion program which was in existence in another office prior to October 1, 1986.  A fee may be collected by an office operating such a preexisting diversion program for the purpose of funding such program.  The amount of the fee for each check shall not exceed:

(a) Twenty-five dollars, if the face value does not exceed $50.

(b) Thirty dollars, if the face value is more than $50 but does not exceed $300.

(c) Forty dollars, if the face value is more than $300.

Battery on a LEO (Law Enforcement Officer)

A battery on an undercover police officer can still count as battery on a Law Enforcement officer if the undercover officer identified his or himself as a police officer.

OFFICER WAS OFF-DUTY AND OUTSIDE JURISDICTION

Ruggles v. State, 757 So.2d 632(Fla. 5th DCA 2000)

OFFICER IN PLAIN CLOTHES

Taylor v. State, 410 So.2d 1358(Fla. 1st DCA 1982)

784.07. Assault or battery of law enforcement officers, firefighters, emergency medical care providers, public transit employees or agents, or other specified officers;  reclassification of offenses;  minimum sentences

(1) As used in this section, the term:

(a) “Law enforcement officer” includes a law enforcement officer, a correctional officer, a correctional probation officer, a part-time law enforcement officer, a part-time correctional officer, an auxiliary law enforcement officer, and an auxiliary correctional officer, as those terms are respectively defined in s. 943.10, and any county probation officer;  employee or agent of the Department of Corrections who supervises or provides services to inmates;  officer of the Parole Commission;  and law enforcement personnel of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, the Department of Environmental Protection, or the Department of Law Enforcement.

(b) “Firefighter” means any person employed by any public employer of this state whose duty it is to extinguish fires;  to protect life or property;  or to enforce municipal, county, and state fire prevention codes, as well as any law pertaining to the prevention and control of fires.

(c) “Emergency medical care provider” means an ambulance driver, emergency medical technician, paramedic, registered nurse, physician as defined in s. 401.23, medical director as defined in s. 401.23, or any person authorized by an emergency medical service licensed under chapter 401 who is engaged in the performance of his or her duties.  The term “emergency medical care provider” also includes physicians, employees, agents, or volunteers of hospitals as defined in chapter 395, who are employed, under contract, or otherwise authorized by a hospital to perform duties directly associated with the care and treatment rendered by the hospital’s emergency department or the security thereof.

(d) “Public transit employees or agents” means bus operators, train operators, revenue collectors, security personnel, equipment maintenance personnel, or field supervisors, who are employees or agents of a transit agency as described in s. 812.015(1)(l).

(2) Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer, a firefighter, an emergency medical care provider, a traffic accident investigation officer as described in s. 316.640, a traffic infraction enforcement officer as described in s. 316.640, a parking enforcement specialist as defined in s. 316.640, or a security officer employed by the board of trustees of a community college, while the officer, firefighter, emergency medical care provider, intake officer, traffic accident investigation officer, traffic infraction enforcement officer, parking enforcement specialist, public transit employee or agent, or security officer is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties, the offense for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows:

(a) In the case of assault, from a misdemeanor of the second degree to a misdemeanor of the first degree.

(b) In the case of battery, from a misdemeanor of the first degree to a felony of the third degree.

(c) In the case of aggravated assault, from a felony of the third degree to a felony of the second degree.  Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any person convicted of aggravated assault upon a law enforcement officer shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 3 years.

(d) In the case of aggravated battery, from a felony of the second degree to a felony of the first degree.  Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any person convicted of aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 5 years.

(3) Any person who is convicted of a battery under paragraph (2)(b) and, during the commission of the offense, such person possessed:

(a) A “firearm” or “destructive device” as those terms are defined in s. 790.001, shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 3 years.

(b) A semiautomatic firearm and its high-capacity detachable box magazine, as defined in s. 775.087(3), or a machine gun as defined in s. 790.001, shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 8 years.

Notwithstanding s. 948.01, adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld, and the defendant is not eligible for statutory gain-time under s. 944.275 or any form of discretionary early release, other than pardon or executive clemency, or conditional medical release under s. 947.149, prior to serving the minimum sentence.

Assault and Battery

assault and battery lawyer, aggravated assault lawyerThough Assault and Battery are often lumped together and mentioned together in conversation, they are actually distinct and different crimes.  An assault does not have to occur for a battery to be committed and likewise a battery does not have to occur for an assault to be committed.

In plain English, a battery is any unwanted and unjustified touching or intentionally causing bodily harm to another, whereas an assault is when a person uses words, actions, and weapons to put another in imminent fear of harm. It is the intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent (Florida Statutes 784.011)

An Aggravated Assault occurs when a weapon is used as an instrument to create a fear in another that his safety was being endangered.

An Aggravated Battery occurs if a person is seriously injured or hit with a weapon even if the injury is minor.

No actual touching necessary to constitute assault or battery
A person can be arrested and convicted of battery, even if the victim was never touched and if something the person is holding or is inside of is touched.  As long ago as 1784, the United States Supreme Court held that even striking one’s cane and not the person himself may constitute a battery (Respublica v. DeLongchamps (1784, U.S. Supreme Court) ).

In 1984, Florida’s 2nd District Court of Appeals upheld one Defendant’s conviction of aggravated battery, although the defendant’s blade stabbed only the money bag that the victim was holding, and not the victim himself (Malczewski v. State, 444 So.2d 1096 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1984)).

As you can see, the law defines what is and is not assault and battery.  Not every accusation of assault and battery has a factual or legal basis.  Let me put my criminal trial expertise to work for you, reviewing your facts against current law, helping to make sure that your rights are protected to the fullest extent of the law, and ensuring that your side of the story gets heard.

 

Other assault and battery cases of note:

Grabbed person’s purse, but not the personNash v. State, 766 So.2d 310 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

“The word “person” in the statute includes an object that has such an intimate connection with the person as to be regarded as a part or extension of the person, such as clothing or an object held by the person.” Malczewski v. State, 444 So.2d 1096, 1099 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)

Hitting a car with person inside, but did not touch or strike person, Clark v. State, 783 So.2d 967 (Fla. 2001)

Criminal Traffic Citations

Criminal Traffic Citations differ from Civil Traffic Citations for the obvious reason that for a Criminal Traffic Citation a person can be sentenced to jail time as well as a fine and receive points against their license.

Some of the more common Criminal Traffic Citations are listed below:

  • Driving Under The Influence
  • Driving While License Suspended With Knowledge
  • Reckless Driving
  • Leaving the Scene of An Accident
  • No Valid Driver’s License
  • Possession of a Suspended Driver’s License
  • Failure to Sign a Criminal Citation
  • Allowing an Unauthorized Driver to Drive

DUI/DWI

Always look on the back of your DUI Citation. YOU HAVE TEN DAYS TO APPLY FOR A FORMAL REVIEW. Always apply for a Formal Review, so you can have a chance to get your license back.

 

JURY INSTRUCTION

DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE

F.S. 316.193

To prove the crime of driving under the influence the state must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

1. (Defendant) drove or was in actual physical control of a vehicle.

2. While driving or in actual physical control of the vehicle (defendant)

Give 2a or b as applicable

a. was under the influence of [alcoholic beverages] [a chemical substance] [a controlled substance] to the extent that [his] [her] normal faculties were impaired or

b. had a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, or a breath-alcohol level of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.

Definitions: give as applicable

“Vehicle” is any device, in, upon or by which any person or property is, or may be, transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.

“Normal faculties” include but are not limited to the ability to see, hear, walk, talk, judge distances, drive an automobile, make judgments, act in emergencies and, in general, to normally perform the many mental and physical acts of our daily lives.

“Actual physical control of a vehicle” means the defendant must be physically in or on the vehicle and have the capability to operate the vehicle, regardless of whether [he] [she] is actually operating the vehicle at the time.

“Alcoholic beverages” are considered to be substances of any kind and description which contain alcohol.

( ) is a controlled substance under Florida law. F.S. 893.

( ) is a chemical substance under Florida law. F.S. 877.111(1).

When appropriate, give one or more of the following instructions on the presumptions of impairment established by F.S. 316.1934(2)(a), (2)(b), and (2)(c).

1. If you find from the evidence that the defendant had a blood or breath alcohol level of 0.05 or less, you shall presume that the defendant was not under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that [his] [her] normal faculties were impaired.

2. If you find from the evidence that the defendant had a blood or breath alcohol level in excess of 0.05 but less than 0.08, you may consider that evidence with other competent evidence in determining whether the defendant was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that [his] [her] normal faculties were impaired; or

3. If you find from the evidence that the defendant had a blood or breath alcohol level of 0.08 or more, that evidence would be sufficient by itself to establish that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol to the extent that [his] [her] normal faculties were impaired. However, such evidence may be contradicted or rebutted by other evidence demonstrating that the defendant was not under the influence to the extent that [his][her] normal faculties were impaired.

These presumptions may be considered along with any other evidence presented in deciding whether the defendant was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that [his] [her] normal faculties were impaired.

Give only if this defense is raised.

It is a defense to the charge of driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence if at the time of the alleged offense the vehicle was inoperable. However, it is not a defense if, while impaired, the defendant drove or was in actual physical control of the vehicle before it became inoperable. Therefore, if you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the vehicle was operable at the time of the alleged offense, you should find the defendant not guilty. However, if you are convinced that the vehicle was operable at the time of the alleged offense, then you should find the defendant guilty if all the other elements of the charge have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

PENALTIES

 

316.193  Driving under the influence; penalties.

(1)  A person is guilty of the offense of driving under the influence and is subject to punishment as provided in subsection (2) if the person is driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state and:

(a)  The person is under the influence of alcoholic beverages, any chemical substance set forth in s. 877.111, or any substance controlled under chapter 893, when affected to the extent that the person’s normal faculties are impaired;

(b)  The person has a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood; or

(c)  The person has a breath-alcohol level of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.

(2)(a)  Except as provided in paragraph (b), subsection (3), or subsection (4), any person who is convicted of a violation of subsection (1) shall be punished:

1.  By a fine of:

a.  Not less than $500 or more than $1,000 for a first conviction.

b.  Not less than $1,000 or more than $2,000 for a second conviction; and

2.  By imprisonment for:

a.  Not more than 6 months for a first conviction.

b.  Not more than 9 months for a second conviction.

3.  For a second conviction, by mandatory placement for a period of at least 1 year, at the convicted person’s sole expense, of an ignition interlock device approved by the department in accordance with s. 316.1938 upon all vehicles that are individually or jointly leased or owned and routinely operated by the convicted person, when the convicted person qualifies for a permanent or restricted license. The installation of such device may not occur before July 1, 2003.

(b)1.  Any person who is convicted of a third violation of this section for an offense that occurs within 10 years after a prior conviction for a violation of this section commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. In addition, the court shall order the mandatory placement for a period of not less than 2 years, at the convicted person’s sole expense, of an ignition interlock device approved by the department in accordance with s. 316.1938 upon all vehicles that are individually or jointly leased or owned and routinely operated by the convicted person, when the convicted person qualifies for a permanent or restricted license. The installation of such device may not occur before July 1, 2003.

2.  Any person who is convicted of a third violation of this section for an offense that occurs more than 10 years after the date of a prior conviction for a violation of this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than $2,000 or more than $5,000 and by imprisonment for not more than 12 months. In addition, the court shall order the mandatory placement for a period of at least 2 years, at the convicted person’s sole expense, of an ignition interlock device approved by the department in accordance with s. 316.1938 upon all vehicles that are individually or jointly leased or owned and routinely operated by the convicted person, when the convicted person qualifies for a permanent or restricted license. The installation of such device may not occur before July 1, 2003.

3.  Any person who is convicted of a fourth or subsequent violation of this section, regardless of when any prior conviction for a violation of this section occurred, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. However, the fine imposed for such fourth or subsequent violation may be not less than $2,000.

(3)  Any person:

(a)  Who is in violation of subsection (1);

(b)  Who operates a vehicle; and

(c)  Who, by reason of such operation, causes or contributes to causing:

1.  Damage to the property or person of another commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

2.  Serious bodily injury to another, as defined in s. 316.1933, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

3.  The death of any human being or unborn quick child commits DUI manslaughter, and commits:

a.  A felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

b.  A felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if:

(I)  At the time of the crash, the person knew, or should have known, that the crash occurred; and

(II)  The person failed to give information and render aid as required by s. 316.062. For purposes of this subsection, the definition of the term “unborn quick child” shall be determined in accordance with the definition of viable fetus as set forth in s. 782.071. A person who is convicted of DUI manslaughter shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 4 years.

(4)  Any person who is convicted of a violation of subsection (1) and who has a blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level of 0.15 or higher, or any person who is convicted of a violation of subsection (1) and who at the time of the offense was accompanied in the vehicle by a person under the age of 18 years, shall be punished:

(a)  By a fine of:

1.  Not less than $1,000 or more than $2,000 for a first conviction.

2.  Not less than $2,000 or more than $4,000 for a second conviction.

3.  Not less than $4,000 for a third or subsequent conviction.

(b)  By imprisonment for:

1.  Not more than 9 months for a first conviction.

2.  Not more than 12 months for a second conviction. 

For the purposes of this subsection, only the instant offense is required to be a violation of subsection (1) by a person who has a blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level of 0.15 or higher.

(c)  In addition to the penalties in paragraphs (a) and (b), the court shall order the mandatory placement, at the convicted person’s sole expense, of an ignition interlock device approved by the department in accordance with s. 316.1938 upon all vehicles that are individually or jointly leased or owned and routinely operated by the convicted person for not less than 6 continuous months for the first offense and for not less than 2 continuous years for a second offense, when the convicted person qualifies for a permanent or restricted license.

(5)  The court shall place all offenders convicted of violating this section on monthly reporting probation and shall require completion of a substance abuse course conducted by a DUI program licensed by the department under s. 322.292, which must include a psychosocial evaluation of the offender. If the DUI program refers the offender to an authorized substance abuse treatment provider for substance abuse treatment, in addition to any sentence or fine imposed under this section, completion of all such education, evaluation, and treatment is a condition of reporting probation. The offender shall assume reasonable costs for such education, evaluation, and treatment. The referral to treatment resulting from a psychosocial evaluation shall not be waived without a supporting independent psychosocial evaluation conducted by an authorized substance abuse treatment provider appointed by the court, which shall have access to the DUI program’s psychosocial evaluation before the independent psychosocial evaluation is conducted. The court shall review the results and recommendations of both evaluations before determining the request for waiver. The offender shall bear the full cost of this procedure. The term “substance abuse” means the abuse of alcohol or any substance named or described in Schedules I through V of s. 893.03. If an offender referred to treatment under this subsection fails to report for or complete such treatment or fails to complete the DUI program substance abuse education course and evaluation, the DUI program shall notify the court and the department of the failure. Upon receipt of the notice, the department shall cancel the offender’s driving privilege, notwithstanding the terms of the court order or any suspension or revocation of the driving privilege. The department may temporarily reinstate the driving privilege on a restricted basis upon verification from the DUI program that the offender is currently participating in treatment and the DUI education course and evaluation requirement has been completed. If the DUI program notifies the department of the second failure to complete treatment, the department shall reinstate the driving privilege only after notice of completion of treatment from the DUI program. The organization that conducts the substance abuse education and evaluation may not provide required substance abuse treatment unless a waiver has been granted to that organization by the department. A waiver may be granted only if the department determines, in accordance with its rules, that the service provider that conducts the substance abuse education and evaluation is the most appropriate service provider and is licensed under chapter 397 or is exempt from such licensure. A statistical referral report shall be submitted quarterly to the department by each organization authorized to provide services under this section.

(6)  With respect to any person convicted of a violation of subsection (1), regardless of any penalty imposed pursuant to subsection (2), subsection (3), or subsection (4):

(a)  For the first conviction, the court shall place the defendant on probation for a period not to exceed 1 year and, as a condition of such probation, shall order the defendant to participate in public service or a community work project for a minimum of 50 hours; or the court may order instead, that any defendant pay an additional fine of $10 for each hour of public service or community work otherwise required, if, after consideration of the residence or location of the defendant at the time public service or community work is required, payment of the fine is in the best interests of the state. However, the total period of probation and incarceration may not exceed 1 year. The court must also, as a condition of probation, order the impoundment or immobilization of the vehicle that was operated by or in the actual control of the defendant or any one vehicle registered in the defendant’s name at the time of impoundment or immobilization, for a period of 10 days or for the unexpired term of any lease or rental agreement that expires within 10 days. The impoundment or immobilization must not occur concurrently with the incarceration of the defendant. The impoundment or immobilization order may be dismissed in accordance with paragraph (e), paragraph (f), paragraph (g), or paragraph (h).

(b)  For the second conviction for an offense that occurs within a period of 5 years after the date of a prior conviction for violation of this section, the court shall order imprisonment for not less than 10 days. The court must also, as a condition of probation, order the impoundment or immobilization of all vehicles owned by the defendant at the time of impoundment or immobilization, for a period of 30 days or for the unexpired term of any lease or rental agreement that expires within 30 days. The impoundment or immobilization must not occur concurrently with the incarceration of the defendant and must occur concurrently with the driver’s license revocation imposed under s. 322.28(2)(a)2. The impoundment or immobilization order may be dismissed in accordance with paragraph (e), paragraph (f), paragraph (g), or paragraph (h). At least 48 hours of confinement must be consecutive.

(c)  For the third or subsequent conviction for an offense that occurs within a period of 10 years after the date of a prior conviction for violation of this section, the court shall order imprisonment for not less than 30 days. The court must also, as a condition of probation, order the impoundment or immobilization of all vehicles owned by the defendant at the time of impoundment or immobilization, for a period of 90 days or for the unexpired term of any lease or rental agreement that expires within 90 days. The impoundment or immobilization must not occur concurrently with the incarceration of the defendant and must occur concurrently with the driver’s license revocation imposed under s. 322.28(2)(a)3. The impoundment or immobilization order may be dismissed in accordance with paragraph (e), paragraph (f), paragraph (g), or paragraph (h). At least 48 hours of confinement must be consecutive.

(d)  The court must at the time of sentencing the defendant issue an order for the impoundment or immobilization of a vehicle. Within 7 business days after the date that the court issues the order of impoundment or immobilization, the clerk of the court must send notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the registered owner of each vehicle, if the registered owner is a person other than the defendant, and to each person of record claiming a lien against the vehicle.

(e)  A person who owns but was not operating the vehicle when the offense occurred may submit to the court a police report indicating that the vehicle was stolen at the time of the offense or documentation of having purchased the vehicle after the offense was committed from an entity other than the defendant or the defendant’s agent. If the court finds that the vehicle was stolen or that the sale was not made to circumvent the order and allow the defendant continued access to the vehicle, the order must be dismissed and the owner of the vehicle will incur no costs. If the court denies the request to dismiss the order of impoundment or immobilization, the petitioner may request an evidentiary hearing.

(f)  A person who owns but was not operating the vehicle when the offense occurred, and whose vehicle was stolen or who purchased the vehicle after the offense was committed directly from the defendant or the defendant’s agent, may request an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the impoundment or immobilization should occur. If the court finds that either the vehicle was stolen or the purchase was made without knowledge of the offense, that the purchaser had no relationship to the defendant other than through the transaction, and that such purchase would not circumvent the order and allow the defendant continued access to the vehicle, the order must be dismissed and the owner of the vehicle will incur no costs.

(g)  The court shall also dismiss the order of impoundment or immobilization of the vehicle if the court finds that the family of the owner of the vehicle has no other private or public means of transportation.

(h)  The court may also dismiss the order of impoundment or immobilization of any vehicles that are owned by the defendant but that are operated solely by the employees of the defendant or any business owned by the defendant.

(i)  All costs and fees for the impoundment or immobilization, including the cost of notification, must be paid by the owner of the vehicle or, if the vehicle is leased or rented, by the person leasing or renting the vehicle, unless the impoundment or immobilization order is dismissed. All provisions of s. 713.78 shall apply.

(j)  The person who owns a vehicle that is impounded or immobilized under this paragraph, or a person who has a lien of record against such a vehicle and who has not requested a review of the impoundment pursuant to paragraph (e), paragraph (f), or paragraph (g), may, within 10 days after the date that person has knowledge of the location of the vehicle, file a complaint in the county in which the owner resides to determine whether the vehicle was wrongfully taken or withheld from the owner or lienholder. Upon the filing of a complaint, the owner or lienholder may have the vehicle released by posting with the court a bond or other adequate security equal to the amount of the costs and fees for impoundment or immobilization, including towing or storage, to ensure the payment of such costs and fees if the owner or lienholder does not prevail. When the bond is posted and the fee is paid as set forth in s. 28.24, the clerk of the court shall issue a certificate releasing the vehicle. At the time of release, after reasonable inspection, the owner or lienholder must give a receipt to the towing or storage company indicating any loss or damage to the vehicle or to the contents of the vehicle.

(k)  A defendant, in the court’s discretion, may be required to serve all or any portion of a term of imprisonment to which the defendant has been sentenced pursuant to this section in a residential alcoholism treatment program or a residential drug abuse treatment program. Any time spent in such a program must be credited by the court toward the term of imprisonment. 

For the purposes of this section, any conviction for a violation of s. 327.35; a previous conviction for the violation of former s. 316.1931, former s. 860.01, or former s. 316.028; or a previous conviction outside this state for driving under the influence, driving while intoxicated, driving with an unlawful blood-alcohol level, driving with an unlawful breath-alcohol level, or any other similar alcohol-related or drug-related traffic offense, is also considered a previous conviction for violation of this section. However, in satisfaction of the fine imposed pursuant to this section, the court may, upon a finding that the defendant is financially unable to pay either all or part of the fine, order that the defendant participate for a specified additional period of time in public service or a community work project in lieu of payment of that portion of the fine which the court determines the defendant is unable to pay. In determining such additional sentence, the court shall consider the amount of the unpaid portion of the fine and the reasonable value of the services to be ordered; however, the court may not compute the reasonable value of services at a rate less than the federal minimum wage at the time of sentencing.

(7)  A conviction under this section does not bar any civil suit for damages against the person so convicted.

(8)  At the arraignment, or in conjunction with any notice of arraignment provided by the clerk of the court, the clerk shall provide any person charged with a violation of this section with notice that upon conviction the court shall suspend or revoke the offender’s driver’s license and that the offender should make arrangements for transportation at any proceeding in which the court may take such action. Failure to provide such notice does not affect the court’s suspension or revocation of the offender’s driver’s license.

(9)  A person who is arrested for a violation of this section may not be released from custody:

(a)  Until the person is no longer under the influence of alcoholic beverages, any chemical substance set forth in s. 877.111, or any substance controlled under chapter 893 and affected to the extent that his or her normal faculties are impaired;

(b)  Until the person’s blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level is less than 0.05; or

(c)  Until 8 hours have elapsed from the time the person was arrested.

(10)  The rulings of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles under s. 322.2615 shall not be considered in any trial for a violation of this section. Testimony or evidence from the administrative proceedings or any written statement submitted by a person in his or her request for administrative review is inadmissible into evidence or for any other purpose in any criminal proceeding, unless timely disclosed in criminal discovery pursuant to Rule 3.220, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.

(11)  The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles is directed to adopt rules providing for the implementation of the use of ignition interlock devices.

(12)  If the records of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles show that the defendant has been previously convicted of the offense of driving under the influence, that evidence is sufficient by itself to establish that prior conviction for driving under the influence. However, such evidence may be contradicted or rebutted by other evidence. This presumption may be considered along with any other evidence presented in deciding whether the defendant has been previously convicted of the offense of driving under the influence.

LICENSE SUSPENSION PERIOD FOR DUI

322.28  Period of suspension or revocation.

(1)  Unless otherwise provided by this section, the department shall not suspend a license for a period of more than 1 year and, upon revoking a license, in any case except in a prosecution for the offense of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages, chemical substances as set forth in s. 877.111, or controlled substances, shall not in any event grant a new license until the expiration of 1 year after such revocation.

(2)  In a prosecution for a violation of s. 316.193 or former s. 316.1931, the following provisions apply:

(a)  Upon conviction of the driver, the court, along with imposing sentence, shall revoke the driver’s license or driving privilege of the person so convicted, effective on the date of conviction, and shall prescribe the period of such revocation in accordance with the following provisions:

1.  Upon a first conviction for a violation of the provisions of s. 316.193, except a violation resulting in death, the driver’s license or driving privilege shall be revoked for not less than 180 days or more than 1 year.

2.  Upon a second conviction for an offense that occurs within a period of 5 years after the date of a prior conviction for a violation of the provisions of s. 316.193 or former s. 316.1931 or a combination of such sections, the driver’s license or driving privilege shall be revoked for not less than 5 years.

3.  Upon a third conviction for an offense that occurs within a period of 10 years after the date of a prior conviction for the violation of the provisions of s. 316.193 or former s. 316.1931 or a combination of such sections, the driver’s license or driving privilege shall be revoked for not less than 10 years. For the purposes of this paragraph, a previous conviction outside this state for driving under the influence, driving while intoxicated, driving with an unlawful blood-alcohol level, or any other alcohol-related or drug-related traffic offense similar to the offense of driving under the influence as proscribed by s. 316.193 will be considered a previous conviction for violation of s. 316.193, and a conviction for violation of former s. 316.028, former s. 316.1931, or former s. 860.01 is considered a conviction for violation of s. 316.193.

(b)  If the period of revocation was not specified by the court at the time of imposing sentence or within 30 days thereafter, and is not otherwise specified by law, the department shall forthwith revoke the driver’s license or driving privilege for the maximum period applicable under paragraph (a) for a first conviction and for the minimum period applicable under paragraph (a) for any subsequent convictions. The driver may, within 30 days after such revocation by the department, petition the court for further hearing on the period of revocation, and the court may reopen the case and determine the period of revocation within the limits specified in paragraph (a).

(c)  The forfeiture of bail bond, not vacated within 20 days, in any prosecution for the offense of driving while under the influence of alcoholic beverages, chemical substances, or controlled substances to the extent of depriving the defendant of his or her normal faculties shall be deemed equivalent to a conviction for the purposes of this paragraph, and the department shall forthwith revoke the defendant’s driver’s license or driving privilege for the maximum period applicable under paragraph (a) for a first conviction and for the minimum period applicable under paragraph (a) for a second or subsequent conviction; however, if the defendant is later convicted of the charge, the period of revocation imposed by the department for such conviction shall not exceed the difference between the applicable maximum for a first conviction or minimum for a second or subsequent conviction and the revocation period under this subsection that has actually elapsed; upon conviction of such charge, the court may impose revocation for a period of time as specified in paragraph (a). This paragraph does not apply if an appropriate motion contesting the forfeiture is filed within the 20-day period.

(d)  When any driver’s license or driving privilege has been revoked pursuant to the provisions of this section, the department shall not grant a new license, except upon reexamination of the licensee after the expiration of the period of revocation so prescribed. However, the court may, in its sound discretion, issue an order of reinstatement on a form furnished by the department which the person may take to any driver’s license examining office for reinstatement by the department pursuant to s. 322.282.

(e)  The court shall permanently revoke the driver’s license or driving privilege of a person who has been convicted four times for violation of s. 316.193 or former s. 316.1931 or a combination of such sections. The court shall permanently revoke the driver’s license or driving privilege of any person who has been convicted of DUI manslaughter in violation of s. 316.193. If the court has not permanently revoked such driver’s license or driving privilege within 30 days after imposing sentence, the department shall permanently revoke the driver’s license or driving privilege pursuant to this paragraph. No driver’s license or driving privilege may be issued or granted to any such person. This paragraph applies only if at least one of the convictions for violation of s. 316.193 or former s. 316.1931 was for a violation that occurred after July 1, 1982. For the purposes of this paragraph, a conviction for violation of former s. 316.028, former s. 316.1931, or former s. 860.01 is also considered a conviction for violation of s. 316.193. Also, a conviction of driving under the influence, driving while intoxicated, driving with an unlawful blood-alcohol level, or any other similar alcohol-related or drug-related traffic offense outside this state is considered a conviction for the purposes of this paragraph.

(3)  The court shall permanently revoke the driver’s license or driving privilege of a person who has been convicted of murder resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle. No driver’s license or driving privilege may be issued or granted to any such person.

(4)(a)  Upon a conviction for a violation of s. 316.193(3)(c)2., involving serious bodily injury, a conviction of manslaughter resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle, or a conviction of vehicular homicide, the court shall revoke the driver’s license of the person convicted for a minimum period of 3 years. If a conviction under s. 316.193(3)(c)2., involving serious bodily injury, is also a subsequent conviction as described under paragraph (2)(a), the court shall revoke the driver’s license or driving privilege of the person convicted for the period applicable as provided in paragraph (2)(a) or paragraph (2)(e).

(b)  If the period of revocation was not specified by the court at the time of imposing sentence or within 30 days thereafter, the department shall revoke the driver’s license for the minimum period applicable under paragraph (a) or, for a subsequent conviction, for the minimum period applicable under paragraph (2)(a) or paragraph (2)(e).

(5)  A court may not stay the administrative suspension of a driving privilege under s. 322.2615 or s. 322.2616 during judicial review of the departmental order that resulted in such suspension, and a suspension or revocation of a driving privilege may not be stayed upon an appeal of the conviction or order that resulted in the suspension or revocation.

(6)  In a prosecution for a violation of s. 316.172(1), and upon a showing of the department’s records that the licensee has received a second conviction within 5 years following the date of a prior conviction of s. 316.172(1), the department shall, upon direction of the court, suspend the driver’s license of the person convicted for a period of not less than 90 days or more than 6 months.

(7)  Following a second or subsequent violation of s. 796.07(2)(f) which involves a motor vehicle and which results in any judicial disposition other than acquittal or dismissal, in addition to any other sentence imposed, the court shall revoke the person’s driver’s license or driving privilege, effective upon the date of the disposition, for a period of not less than 1 year. A person sentenced under this subsection may request a hearing under s. 322.271.

Felonies and Misdemeanors

What’s the difference between a felony and a misdemeanor?

As a general rule, a felony is a crime that may be punished by a sentence of imprisonment for a year or more, while misdemeanors may be punished by no more than a year in the county jail.

 

Degrees of crimes

In the State of Florida, crimes are divided into different degrees based on the standards of the community.  The punishment given for the commission of a crime ought to be neither more severe nor more lenient than the perceived damage to the person or property of another.  As representatives of the collective will of Florida residents, the Legislature has categorized crimes into degrees of misdemeanors and felonies reflecting differing levels of seriousness of different crimes:

 

Classification/Degree of Crime

Statutory Maximum Sentence

Minimum

Sentence

Example crimes

Felony

Capital

Death Life w/o Parole Heinous, atrocious, and cruel murders

Life w/o Parole

Natural Life Natural Life Sexual battery of a minor under 12

1st

30 years to Life Probation to 30 years in prison. Kidnapping, home invasion robbery

2nd

15 years Probation to 15 years in prison. Grand theft $20,000-100,000

3rd

5 years Probation to five years in prison. Aggravated assault
Misdemeanor

1st

365 days Probation Repeat trespassing

2nd

60 days Probation Petit theft

Any degree of crime defended

As a Florida Bar Certified Criminal Trial Expert, I have the required experience and skill needed to defend you against any degree of accusation.  Whether you insist on a trial or enter into plea negotiations, my aim is to make sure you receive a legal sentence, presenting to the sentencing judge and to the State reasons why you should receive a more merciful sentence.

“I don’t need no stinking license to drive a scooter.”

The Moped-Myth comes in and out of vogue every few years.  People swearing that they were told by the person who sold them the moped, the manufacturer of the moped, a police officer, a lawyer, a Judge, their bunkmate in the county jail or it was written in the box it came in or in the operators’ manual, that it was legal to drive a moped without a driver’s license.  But no one can call forth a credible witness or produce a box or manual supporting their claim.

Basically, if a person is driving a motor vehicle upon a highway,19 he needs a driver’s license.  Only a golf cart,20 vehicles moved solely by human power, motorized wheelchairs, and motorized bicycles are exempt from the license requirement.21 Just because it has a motor with a displacement of 50 CCs or less does not eliminate the need for a driver’s license to operate it. It just means it is not a motorcycle,22 and a motorcycle endorsement is not necessary to drive it.  A driver’s license is needed to operate a moped,23 a go-ped,24 and even an ATV25 on a highway. Calling it a scooter, moped or go-ped doesn’t make a difference unless whatever it is called fits the definition of a motorized bicycle.26

A basis in truth to the Moped-Myth and the Scooter-Saga is fueled by the confusion found when people start reading Chapter 316 of the Florida Statutes, which excludes a moped and a motorized scooter from the definition of motor vehicle.27 But the rules of statutory construction dictate that the definition used in the chapter making the restriction (Chapter 322), unless deemed ambiguous shall be used before resorting to definitions found in other chapters.28 Obviously, another basis in truth to the Scooter-Saga is that a person can drive a motorized-bicycle without a license. The problem is that what most people are driving on the highway without a license is not a motorized-bicycle, despite all the unhelpful legal advice they claim to have been given to the contrary.

However, that bad advice could possibly be transformed into a basis for a Mistake of Fact defense29 when defending a suspended license case by arguing that the person mistakenly believed that he was driving a motorized bicycle.  And if that works the Moped-Myth can become a reality.

“The police officer had no reason to follow me when he saw me pull out of a bar, and cannot run my tag without reason.”

Even though it doesn’t seem fair for a police officer to be allowed to wait for a person to drive away from a bar, follow that person, and then stop the person for driving in a manner that makes the officer think the person is ill, injured or impaired (or really just impaired or why else would the officer wait until the person left the bar), it still isn’t entrapment when the person is arrested for DUI.

And even when the three illusory I-words or buzzwords10 found on every officers’ cheat sheet (right along with such other fraternal favorites as: training & experience, spontaneous utterance, furtive movements, bulge, plain view, Officer safety, and odor of cannabis) do not exist, a police officer can still pull up behind any automobile for no reason and run its tag number.

And if the tag comes back registered to a person with a suspended license, or no driver’s license, the officer can make a lawful stop.11 Unless of course it is obvious that the person driving the car does not match the description of the owner.12 However, the officer does not have to try to confirm this prior to the stop, but if after the stop as the officer is approaching the vehicle he realizes the driver is obviously not the registered owner, then all the officer can do is make personal contact with the driver to explain the reason for the stop.13The officer cannot ask to see the person’s driver’s license14 or in any other way continue to detain the person, unless as the officer approaches he observes one of the aforementioned buzzwords15 or recognizes the person as being on the FBI’s Most Wanted List, having an active warrant16 or suspended license, and the information is not stale.17

Speed traps are not entrapment, either.  Police officers can hide at night with their lights out in an unmarked vehicle to catch a person speeding.

These myths besides finding their basis for truth in the fourth amendment and entrapment also find their basis for truth in the belief that the police are not allowed to use trickery and deception to enforce the law.  But as long as the police do not take it too far, trickery and deception are allowed.18

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